A basic proposition in the literature on social movements is that collective action is more likely when members share common collective identities -a "we-feeling" sustained through interactions among movement participants, and expressed through cultural materials such as names, narratives, symbols, and rituals (Taylor and Whittier 1992) . The premise is that identification with a group helps group members overcome the collective action dilemma (Klandermans, 2002) , and that identification is possible when individuals self-categorize themselves as belonging to the same group and stereotype themselves and others as similar (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) . Strikingly, however, it is only recently that social movement researchers have devoted attention to the linkage amongst a community"s demographic characteristics, shared identity and the incidence of protests. A number of sociologists have argued that there is a link between a community"s sociodemographic structure and collective action (Molotch, Freudenberg, and Paulsen, 2000; Sampson et al., 2005) -the basic intuition is that potential identities are inherent in the socio-demographic characteristics of a focal community and becoming activated and thereby, embodied in collective action.
However, there is a debate as to how socio-demographic structure evokes identity.
One view is that homogeneity makes it easier for activists to mobilize collective action. Tilly (1973) , argued that a community that consists of homogenous groups would generally be mobilized at lower cost than a heterogeneous community. In a recent review, Costa and Kahn (2003) show that 15 papers show that heterogeneity reduces solidarity, and therefore, civic engagement to produce public goods. In their study of social protest against chain-stores, Ingram and Rao (2004) reported that states in which independent businesses were concentrated in a retail segment were able to more easily mobilize to protest against chain stores than states where retail businesses spanned many segments. Miguel and Gugerty (2005) reviewed a number of studies which suggested that ethnic diversity in communities impeded collective action.
A rival argument is that socio-demographic diversity fosters collective action. Hardin (1982) reasoned that heterogeneous groups are more likely to contain interested and resourceful members who may provide collective goods. Diversity makes it possible for activists to mobilize different constituencies (Oberschall, 1973; McAdam, 1982) . Kocak and Carroll (2005) found that the arrival of new immigrant groups with different religious backgrounds activated the identities of existing groups in a community and increased church attendance. Okamoto (2003) observed that segregation of Asian Americans as a group fostered collective action. Greve, Pozner and Rao (2006) also found that educational diversity powered the formation of low-power FM radio stations.
We focus attention on the role of racial diversity since it is a simple, accessible, and visible dimension of diversity and categorization. We ask if the racial diversity of a community increases or reduces against protests against Wal-Mart"s entry into a community during the period starting from 1998 and ending in 2005. Critically, the participants in social movements that target organizations are different than those that target states. Most obviously, they need to overcome the dearth of a cohesive identity. Those who stand against the state may be united under the umbrella of "citizens" but what of those who oppose Wal-Mart? All social movements must have the bases of collective action, but the problem is heightened in this case because the anti-Wal-Mart forces do not represent any natural group or category that might be referenced to evoke recognition of shared interests.
We note that our interest lies in understanding whether racial diversity is a causal mechanism that explains protest against Wal-Mart and not whether it enables accurate predictions of the probability of protest against Wal-Mart in a particular community. A previous study by Ingram, Yue and Rao (2010) showed that community level characteristics do not allow for good predictions of protests against Wal-Mart and suggested that Wal-Mart faced uncertainty in predicting protests. So Wal-Mart relies on low-cost probes that take the form of proposals to open a store, and withdraws if it face protests that are a) backed by a special organization opposing Wal-Mart, or b) occur in a community surrounded by other protesting communities, or c) in a state where tough restrictions on the size of the store have been placed (Ingram, Yue and Rao, 2010) .
A number of scholars suggest that explanation rather than prediction ought to be a test of the causal adequacy of a theory (See Elster, 1999; Liberson and Lynn, 2002) . Scriven (1959:477) opined that "Satisfactory explanation of the past is possible even when prediction of the future is impossible" (p. 477). Accordingly, we draw on data from Ingram, Yue and Rao (2010) to understand the explanatory role of racial diversity. Of course, a causal mechanism ought to account for alternative mechanisms or causes of the outcome (Elster, 1999) . Accordingly, in our case, we account for a community"s pride and attachment to the place that might underlie its propensity against a Wal -Mart store. We use distance from historical monuments as a proxy -communities with such a monument or close to it are likely to have attachment when compared to communities far away from such monuments. We ask if racial diversity has a causal role despite accounting for a community"s pride and attachment to a place. We recognize that protests against Wal-Mart stores are only possible if Wal-Mart proposes to open a store in the community in the first place -so there is a selection bias. We use a two -stage Heckman procedure to account for selection to understand the effect of racial diversity on protests against Wal-Mart.
RACIAL DIVERSITY, SHARED IDENTITY AND PROTEST
Social identification theory and its successor, self-categorization theory suggest rely on the notion of psychological groups. Turner (1984:530 ) defined a psychological group as "a collection of people who share the same social identification or define themselves in terms of the same social category member-ship." Thus, members of a psychological group do not need to interact with or like other members, or be in turn, be liked and accepted by them. Thus, psychological groups can comprise of anonymous individuals. By contrast, social groups require interaction and liking for cohesion to ensue. A number of studies have shown that minimal group structure is enough to trigger selfcategorization as a member of a psychological group; simply assigning an individual to a group is sufficient to generate in-group favoritism (Abrams and Hogg, 2004) .
Race is one of the "big three" categories in person perception -the other two being sex and age (Fiske and Neuberg, 1990) . A number of studies show that race categories are chronically accessible to anyone in America (e.g. Dovodio et al. 1997; Fazio et al, 1997) . Race is simple, accessible, and a visible basis of categorizing onself as a member of a psychological group. Typically, race based categories enable individuals to construct a clear group prototype and also to assess their own self -protypicality, and thereby, reduce uncertainty (Hogg and Abrams, 1993) . Self-categorization depersonalizes perception and conduct such that members, including oneself, are not processed as complex, multidimensional whole persons but rather as embodiments of the contextually salient group prototype. (Hogg & Hains, 1996, p. 295) .
From the perspective of the members of a collectivity, individuals are more likely to identify with others that are similar to themselves. As a result, cohesion is especially strong within a homogeneous group, and members are also more likely to identify themselves with a cohesive group that conveys conformity rewards from other members. In a homogeneous community, the barriers of collective action can be overcome, and community members can be more easily mobilized to defend their common interests (Yue, Luo, and Ingram, 2009 ). Thus we expect that communities with high levels of racial homogeneity are more likely to mobilize protests against Wal-Mart.
The rival argument is that racial diversity fosters collective action because heterogeneous groups are more likely to contain resourceful members who may provide collective goods (Hardin, 1982) and mobilize different constituencies (Oberschall, 1973; McAdam, 1982) . So here the prediction is that racial diversity is likely to increase protests against Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart"s expansion agitates fierce debates by the public. Critics blame Wal-Mart"s unprecedented scale of operation for undermining communities. They argue that Wal-Mart drives out mom-and-pop stores and thus erases the characteristics of local communities and destroys an epicenter of an organic community life. They further argue that Wal-Mart"s low price policy has put up a high social cost, as its wage level lowers the living standard of the working class and its reliance on cheap imports from oversea causes the loss of jobs in American communities. By contrast supporters perceive Wal-Mart"s economies of scale as a source of efficiency and economic gains. They argue that Wal-Mart"s replacement of other stores is a typical instance of creative disruption in which inefficient business models are selected out by competition. They further argue that Wal-Mart"s low-price policy is not a peril but a boon to the working class, as it enhances the purchase power of the poor and affords them more economic freedom.
WAL-MART: GROWTH, DOMAIN CONSENSUS, AND SOCIAL PROTEST
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Echoing the divide in public opinion, academic research on the effects of Wal-Mart stores shows that they have mixed effects on the communities in which they are located. For example, retail employment declines as a result of Wal-Mart entry (Basker, 2005a, Dube, Eidlin and Lester, 2007) , but consumers benefit from 3% overall price declines in competing stores, and in the case of some items, the declines are as high as 13% (Basker, 2005b, Hausman and Leibtag, 2005) . Regarding the impact on other retailers, some scholars find that Wal-Mart has negative effects on local retailers (Irwin and Clark, 2006; Jia, 2008) , and supercenters undermine grocery stores and other retailers. But others find that Wal-Mart has no harmful impact on small retailers and self-employment (Dean and Sobel, 2008) .
Some even further find that small stores that locate close to Wal-Mart but have a low degree of product overlap with Wal-Mart benefit from Wal-Mart"s entry (Zhu, Singh, and Dukes, 2005) .
The mixed effects paint a clouded picture about whether a community will protest Wal-Mart"s entry and highlight the necessity to understand the factors that underlies the mobilization of ii We estimated the proposal time for each of the opened stores as 789 days before the opening, a figure that represents the average time between proposal and ope ning for stores where both dates are available. Second, we collected protest data from Sprawl-Busters, an anti Wal-Mart organization that has been collecting the news about anti big-box store protests from various sources since 1998
iii . From the Sprawl-Busters database, we selected all the protests that targeted at Wal-Mart"s store proposals from 1998 to 2005. We also collected reports of protests from other activists" websites. A protest against a proposed Wal-Mart store can be reported multiple times, and we coded the multiple reports as one protest as long as they were targeted at the same store proposal.
Third, we conducted a media search for reports about Wal-Mart"s store proposals and protests from 1998 to 2005 using the Lexis-Nexis and the America"s News database. Finally, we matched the data of proposed stores and protests obtained from the three sources and dropped the duplicated cases. In total, Wal-Mart made 1599 new store proposals in 1207 places, 563 of which saw protests, and 1040 ultimately resulted in store openings.
The multiple sources of our data, including the representations of Wal-Mart, protestors and the media, mitigate the concern about selection bias that would loom large if we relied on only one source.
Confirming the comprehensiveness of coverage, we find that over 90% of proposed stores either result in actual openings or appear in at least two sources we used. Moreover, our results remain substantially the same if we drop the proposals without multi-source confirmation.
Dependent Variable and Estimation
Protests happened in a variety of forms, including rally and demonstration, requiring public hearings, collecting citizens" signatures to initiate petition, requiring studies of Wal -Mart"s impact on local businesses, traffic and environment, highlighting environmental hazards, deploying zoning restrictions, lobbying for store-size cap legislations, and filing lawsuits against Wal-Mart or local government.
In estimating the factors that influence the incidence of protests, we faced a sample selection We predicted the likelihood that Wal-Mart actually proposed to open a store in a place in a year by using the place"s natural-log-transformed population, median household income, and distance to the nearest Wal-Mart"s distribution center, the percentage of union membership in the private employment sector in the state, and calendar year as explaining variables. In the second stage, we estimated a Probit model of protests by controlling the sample selection coefficient, including all independent and control variables, and reporting geographically clustered robust standard errors.
Independent and Control Variables
To test the effect of racial diversity, we measured racial homogeneity using a Herfindahl index for each place i: To test the effect of historical monuments, we created a variable that measures the log-transformed geographical distance to the closest historical landmark. We first obtained a list of national historical landmarks from the website of the National Park Service (http://www.nps.gov/nhl/). We then obtained the longitude and latitude of these landmarks from the website of Wikipedia. For those the latitude and longitude of which are not listed on Wikipedia, we used the coordinate of the center of their location place from the Census of 2000. We then calculated the distance using the following formula, distance=3437*acos(sin(latA)*sin(latB)+cos(latA)*cos(latB)*cos(longA-longB)), where A refers to a place and B refers to a historical landmark. The unit of the distance is one mile.
We used a number of controls. We first controlled the population size, unemployment rate, income per capita, and the percentage of urban population in a place. We controlled the migration level in a place by including the percentage of a county"s population over 5 years old in 2000 that had a residence in a different county five years ago. All these data were collected from the 2000 Population Census.
We measured a place"s Pro Democrat political orientation using the county-level vote margins of those supporting Democrat presidential candidate over those supporting Republican candidate during the nearest past presidential election. We included a variable to control the hazard of institutional escalation by including a dummy variable that indicates whether an enacted legislation that restrains store size exists elsewhere within the same state in the prior year. We collected the data about the municipallevel store size legislation from the Institute for Local Self-Reliance.
We controlled the contagion effect of protests in nearby communities by including the count of prior protests weighted by geographical distance. Besides, we tried a variety of other variables to define protests in nearby communities, like protests within the same SMA area, within 100 miles, or within 200 miles. We also tried to weight these variables by the effect of time decay (i.e., decay by days or only count those protests within the past 365 days). All these variables are highly correlated and generate similar results. Thus, we report only the result of the prior protests weighted by geographical distance.
We A set of variables about a place"s retail economy are also included. We measured the percentage of civil labor force employed in the retail sector using the data from the Census of 2000. We also controlled the state-level count of stores that are affiliated with Wal-Mart's two major competitors, Target and K-Mart, lagged by one year. The data were collected from Target and K-Mart"s annual reports as well as K-Mart store closing lists before and after its bankruptcy.
We controlled two other variables that are possibly related to the organization of protests. The first is the density of union measured by the percentage of workers that are union members in a state"s private sectors in the previous year. The union data were obtained from the Current Population Survey.
The second is the number of churches per capita in a county in 2000, collected from the Association of Religion Data Archives.
We created two variables to control the characteristics of local governments. One is the government's debt per capita, measured by the total outstanding debt of a county government divided by the county"s population. The data were collected from Census of Government in 1997 and 2002. The other is the structure of local government. We created a dummy variable, city manager, to indicate whether a local government adopts the council-manager form of government (for contrast is the mayor-council form of government). The data were collected from the Municipal Yearbook and local governments" websites.
We controlled the influence of media's attention on anti Wal-Mart protests using two variables.
One is the ln-transformed annual count of editorials with "Wal-Mart" as a key word, lagged by one year iv . The other is the annual percentage of editorials discussing unfavorable topics about Wal-Mart v .
The data were collected from the America"s News database. Finally, we controlled the year of a proposal. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics.
Insert Table 1 -2 about here Model 2 tests the impact of race homogeneity on the incidence of protests. We find that r ace homogeneity is positively related to a place"s likelihood to protest (b=0.737, p<.01), supporting the view that homogeneity facilitates mobilization. If a place"s race homogeneity increases from the one standard deviation below the mean level to one standard deviation above, the probability of protest increases from 24% to 33% when holding every other variables at their means. Moreover, the coefficient of the distance to historical monuments also turned significant (b=-0.054, p<.05), showing that the further away a place from a historical monument, the lower the chance of a protest and confirming that proximity to historical sites is an important source of local pride and identity and boosts the chance of mobilization.
RESULTS
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Big business organizations have become one of the most important features of American social landscape (Perrow, 2002) . More and more, big firms have come to constitute societies in themselves, expanding their bureaucratic and hierarchical forms to guide the patterns of social exchanges. As big business organizations penetrate and constitute the basic social fabric, they have increasin gly become the targets of social movement activists who seek to address social problems (Davis et al., 2005; King and Soule, 2007; Baron and Diermeier, 2008) . Moreover, activists have recognized that business targets are more responsive to external pressures than political targets such as the state or legislatures.
As a result, activists are quickly developing and testing their repertoires for contesting private organizations.
Our results show that the ability of activists to launch protests hinges on community identity.
Communities that are composed of a racially homogeneous population and that have local pride and attachments experience a significantly higher chance of mobilization than others. Regarding social demographic diversity, researchers have been debating whether homogeneity or heterogeneity will facilitate mobilization. The debate is centered on whether the resources associated with diversity would compensate for the loss of cohesion. In our research context, most anti Wal-Mart protests are smallscale local events. Most of forms of protest that local activists engaged in are generally not very resource-consuming. However, as we argued in the theory, the expansion of Wal-Mart is highly controversial in the U.S., and besides protestors, there is a substantial proportion of the population who either enthusiastically support or at least sympathize Wal-Mart. Thus racial diversity is not only likely to dilute the "we-feeling" but also associated with conflicts of interests, and thus dampens the incidence of protests.
Regarding local pride and attachments, we find that communities close to historical landmarks are more successful in their mobilization efforts. The social identity literature suggests that the uniqueness and positivity of a group attract individuals to self-categorize themselves as affiliating with the group, as people gain a distinct sense of positive self-esteem from their identity groups, which furthers a sense of community and belonging (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) . Historical sites are an imporant factor in building community identity and pride. For example, Ingram and Inman (1996) found that the battlefield of the War of 1812 was strategically employed by institutional entrepreneurs to activate the national identity of local businessmen and to motivate them to engage into collective actions. Similarly, a recent proposal by Wal-Mart to build a store in Orange county of Virginia inspired intensive protests that drew national attention, because of its closeness to the Wilderness Battlefield of the Civil War (Yahoo, 2009 ).
Our results also indicate that the incidence of anti-Wal-Mart protests shows a clear sensitivity to local political ideology and that communities where liberal ideology is prevalent are more likely to spark the protests against the entrance of big businesses. This finding is consistent with the previous work that finds that the anti-business political ideology slowed the deregulation of interstate banking (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999) . Together, these findings provide further support for social movement theorists" proposals that external political atmospheres tip the power balance between activists and their target (McAdams, 1995) and that activists" claims gain resonance where they are consistent with local dominant cultures and values (Bernstein, 1997) .
Finally, our paper contributes to organizational theory by showing that movement activism is an important component of organizations" external environment. Our results as well as the findings of other recent works suggest that activists may not work alone to exert influence but, instead, they often collaborate with the media, the legislative institutes, or other stakeholders. As social movement activists have increasingly target business organizations, a task for organizational theorists is to further explore the mechanisms that influence the interaction between social movement activists and business organizations. 
